Neither the academic literature nor the tort reform lobby has observed a deep irony in the American law of enterprise liability. The intellectual roots of enterprise liability lie in a late nineteenth-century movement to reengineer the workplace, a movement whose best known exponent was scientific manager Frederick Winslow Taylor. Along with a generation of managerial engineers, Taylor popularized broad ideas about managerial responsibility for the operations of enterprise-ideas that when loosed on the decentralized institutions of American tort law ultimately found one of their strongest expressions in the law of enterprise liability. Enterprise liability thus stands as one of the great twentieth-century examples of the unanticipated consequences of social action.
Most significant for my interests here, Taylorism's beginnings were closely bound up in efforts to systematize the way in which firms dealt with industrial accidents. Beginning in the 1880s, a number of sophisticated firms established accident insurance benefit programs for their employees. In the same years, an early generation of managerial engineers developed new ideas about reengineering workplace safety. By the early decades of the twentieth century, these developments in firms' treatment of industrial accidents had achieved some remarkable successes. After 1910, workmen's compensation statutes (as they were known in genderspecific terms12) formalized the accident insurance benefits with which certain leading firms had experimented in the preceding decades. And in the second and third decades of the twentieth century, many American employers implemented earlier engineers' pioneering ideas about safety in the workplace. Yet the largely successful campaign to remake the nature of work and to expand the scope of managerial prerogatives in the American economy gave rise (or so I shall argue here) to a conception of enterprise responsibility-also exceptionally vigorous in the United States-that turned out to be far broader than any of scientific management's early twentieth-century proponents had anticipated. Once loosed, the rationalizing ideas underlying scientific management took on a life of their own in the labyrinthine, highly decentralized, and nonrationalized structures of American tort law. I should clarify that this article is not a study of the possible unanticipated consequences of enterprise liability itself.13 Nor is it a study of the wide array of unanticipated consequences that followed from the systemic planning aspirations of Taylorite engineers. Taylorism produced unintended results such as bitter strikes by resistant workers,14 as well as results both unintended and unanticipated, such as Louis Brandeis's wellknown appropriation of scientific management theories in 1911 to oppose proposed railroad rate increases.15 This article singles out a particular unanticipated consequence (or set of unanticipated consequences) from among many arising out of the transformation of labor management in the early twentieth-century firm. In the resonances between scientific management and enterprise liability lie some interesting lessons for lawyers and historians-lessons about the origins of one of the great legal transformations of our time, and lessons about the dialectic of resistance and accommodation that characterizes the response of many of our far-flung legal institutions to systemic efforts to rationalize social institutions.
In what follows, Part I describes the managerial engineering movement that began in the United States in the 1880s. Part II turns to the encounter of managerial engineers with the turn-of-the-century American industrial accident crisis. Part III focuses on one strand of that encounter, namely the accident insurance benefit programs that certain sophisticated employers instituted for their employees. Part IV then details the first generation of managerial engineering efforts to improve American workplace safety, out of which arose a novel theory of managerial causation in work injuries. Part V traces ideas pioneered in scientific management-including what may have been the first use of the term "enterprise liability"-into the mid-twentieth-century liability explosion.
I.
Forerunners to scientific management arose out of a late nineteenthcentury crisis of confidence in competition and markets. The political economy ofJacksonian America had replaced entrenched monopoly with markets as the leading mechanism for economic development; equal rights for all market actors replaced special incentives for a few as the dominant approach to economic development.16 In the North, this shift was especially pronounced in the field of labor, where the incentives of a system of contracting came to be thought by many as superior in efficiency terms to coercion. Markets in free labor put the "silent compulsion of economic relations," to use Marx's phrase, to work in the extraction of labor power from the worker.17 In Marx's critical account, the market mechanism for labor control "surpasse[d] all earlier systems of production, which were based on directly compulsory labour, in its energy and its quality of unbounded and ruthless activity."18 And indeed, many early advocates of free labor were remarkably frank about their reliance on the motivating force of hunger and poverty to spur on a labor force.19 But in more affirmative accounts that began to emerge as early as the late eighteenth century and culminated in the United States in the decade leading up to the Civil War, free labor was the key to the progressive development of human societies away from anachronistic regimes of feudal authority, status hierarchies, and slavery. From Adam Smith to made it possible to remain relatively self-directing in the details of industrial work processes.31 Thus, late into the nineteenth century, skilled workers were able to make and implement union work rules to maintain a modicum of autonomy in the production process.32 Even among unskilled workers, piece-work payment systems (though often exploitative in their own way) had the similar effect of contracting particular labor arrangements out of the hierarchical master-servant relation. 33 Many observers began to rethink the value of free labor in the employment relation, as well. It bears noting here that the "freedom" of the free labor employment relation has always been ambiguous.34 Mid-nineteenth-century approaches to labor management, for example, presented a curious mix of market mechanisms and employer-employee hierarchy. Business historians have labeled mid-nineteenth-century workshops and factories the "foreman's empire."35 Although there was considerable variation among industries, foremen-usually skilled workers with little formal training who had risen through the ranks-generally utilized the "driving" method of labor management, a method that combined "authoritarian rule and physical compulsion."36 Foremen "pushe[d] the gang" of workers using an array of gestures and profanity known as "Rolling-mill English" to get the work done.37 At the same time, the emerging law of employment contracts made employees' subjection to their employers' control the core feature of the employment relation. 38 In those firms that sought to replace worker discretion with command-and-control hierarchies, employer control of the production process was often crude and imprecise by twentieth-century standards.39 Foremen dominated the shop floor, with little accountability and few standards of conduct to guide the exercise of their authority.40 Ineffec- tive cost accounting mechanisms obscured the relative costs and merits of various approaches to employee management.41 And while the often arbitrary power of the foreman system was antithetical to the culture of skilled industrial craftsmen, the foreman system of labor management was frequently ineffective and sloppy.42 As a matter of practice, then, workers frequently retained considerable discretion over work processes. The crisis of confidence in markets of the 1880s, however, called into question this mix of market mechanisms and often haphazard employer control. To be sure, there had been earlier challenges to the idea that free labor was efficient labor. The experience of emancipation in Jamaica after 1838, for example, seemed to many English and American entrepreneurs to cast into doubt whether former slaves would work for wages as productively as they had worked under the compulsion of slavery.43 Reconstruction in the United States seemed to hold a similar lesson for many northern whites who sought to take over southern plantations after the Civil War.44 But with the great railroad strikes of 1877, the nationwide strikes inspired by the Knights of Labor in 1886, and the Homestead strike of 1892 (which featured the famous pitched battle between steel workers and Pinkerton detectives hired by Henry Clay Frick), employment relations came to appear especially susceptible to the waste and friction that many had begun to identify in competitive markets more generally.45 Relations between labor and management, on this view, presented another example of the ways in which markets led to inefficient and wasteful systems of production. The "foreman's empire,"46 it seemed, lacked the systematic precision that modern conditions appeared to require.
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Influential leaders in American business responded to the late nineteenth-century crises of overcompetition and labor conflict by moving to replace markets with hierarchies. Some of the nation's leading firms sought to establish a new corporatist political economy that would eliminate ruinous competition and reduce labor-management conflict by removing both of these aspects of economic life from the market. Firms in COLUMBIA LAW REV IEW industries such as steel sought repeatedly, but with little success, to form "gentlemen's agreements and pools ... in an effort to control ... production."47 When enforcement problems caused most such initiatives to collapse,48 American industrialists turned to the business trust and the corporate merger to police against comnpetitive pressures.49 Large scale enterprise, argued industrialists such as S.C.T. Dodd of Standard Oil, James Hill of the Great Northern Railway, and Charles Schwab of U.S. Steel, offered the benefit of substantial economies of scale.50 Moreover, men such as Charles Francis Adams of the Union Pacific Railroad argued in the 1880s that the advancement of civilization led inevitably toward big business. "[T]he principle of consolidation ... is a necessity-a natural law of growth," Adams argued; "[y]ou may not like it: you will have to reconcile yourselves to it."51 In the "modern world" business necessarily "does its work through vast aggregations of men and capital.... This is a sort of latter-day manifest destiny."52 A second strand of the hierarchical reorganization of economic production focused not on cooperation and consolidation among firms, but rather on the reorganization of production within the firm. American labor management practices in the mid-nineteenth century had given little indication of the strength of the managerial movement that was to come. Into the middle of the nineteenth century, American enterprise exhibited little systematic organization of the production process. So long as the scale of production remained relatively small, Alfred Chandler has argued, there was little call for systemic attention to the rational organization of the workplace itself.53 And yet by the turn of the twentieth century, American firms laid claim to managerial control of the production process with a vigor unmatched in Western economies.54 In Chandler's magisterial interpretation, the coming of the railroad brought with it new opportunities for rational managerial approaches to running 47 
10
[Vol. 103:1 SPEEDY FRED TAYLOR business enterprises.55 Railroads themselves posed significant challenges of organization, management, and coordination. Time zones had to be standardized so as to establish consistent and reliable scheduling, track gauges had to be integrated and standardized, bridges and overpasses had to be built according to industry standards for car sizes and weights, large and widely dispersed workforces had to be managed, and goods in transit had to be coordinated with schedules and railroad cars.56 Moreover, the railroads created for the first time the possibility of taking advantage of economies of scale in mass production. Before the railroad, raw material could not be amassed in sufficient quantities, and finished goods could not be shipped quickly enough, to support mass expansion of the production process. But with railroad shipping bringing new speed and capacity to the movement of materials and goods, firms were suddenly able to expand production dramatically. And with expansion came a new need for, as well as new economies of scale to facilitate, the rationalization of the production process to coordinate materials, labor, and distribution. By the turn of the century, managers in steel production turned with new interest to the rationalization of labor management.61 Leading management engineer O.M. Becker argued that under modern production methods "human machinery" was the "most important part" of the firm, and indeed accounted for a substantial portion of most firms' variable costs.62 The foreman system and the crude approach to production with 55 which it was associated, however, were wholly unable to cope with the complex new demands of labor management in the age of large scale mechanization.63 A rational and "scientific" approach to labor management, on the other hand, promised to provide new ways to accommodate workers to managerial incursions on traditionally worker-controlled aspects of the production process.64 Organizations such as the American Society of Mechanical Engineers thus began to emphasize labor management questions rather than mechanical or purely engineering matters.65 The new problem in the organization of production, it seemed, was the adoption of "new shop methods" as "a corollary of modern machinery."66 As engineer John Patterson put it in 1900, "the problems of to-day in factory management are not so much problems of machinery as of men; not so much of organization as of personal relations."67 Frederick Winslow Taylor stood at the forefront of the movement to rationalize the American workplace.68 Born in 1856 to a wealthy Philadelphia Quaker family, Taylor became a journeyman machinist after a mysterious (and apparently stress related) eye ailment ended his preparations for the Harvard College entrance exam. Within a few short years he had become a foreman at the important Philadelphia steel company, Midvale Steel, and a close advisor to its owner. In 1885, he joined the American Society of Mechanical Engineers.69
The 
SPEEDY FRED TAYLOR
Quakers had played an important role in galvanizing Northern support for antislavery ideas.71 Taylor, however, had little use for Quaker notions of human perfectibility or for the consensual approach to social relations that followed from such notions.72 In his view, the free labor system of the postwar years, which relied on "initiative and incentive" to induce labor, had led to systematic shirking-"soldiering," he called it-by obstructionist workers.73
In Taylor's view, labor markets that relied on initiative and incentive were hopelessly wasteful. In combination with clumsy, ill-trained foremen, incentive based systems of labor management necessarily meant that "each workman shall be left with the final responsibility for doing his job practically as he thinks best, with comparatively little help and advice from the management."74 As a result, instead of a standard practice for a given step in the production process, there were "fifty or a hundred different ways of doing each element of the work," ways that had been "handed down from man to man by word of mouth."75 "[T]here was," however, "but a remote chance" in such a system "that [any one worker] should hit upon the one best method of doing each piece of work out of the hundreds of possible methods which lay before him."76 Theodore Roosevelt and Gifford Pinchot had begun to teach the nation to recognize waste in the exploitation of natural resources such as forests, water, topsoil, and minerals.77 "But our larger wastes of human effort," Taylor complained, "which go on every day through such of our acts as are blundering, ill-directed, or inefficient ... are less visible, less tangible, and are but vaguely appreciated."78
The answer was to reengineer work and to put into place precisely calibrated methods for even the most routine tasks in the production process. Scientific reorganization of the processes of work would allow management to "substitut[e] . . . science for the individual judgment of the workman."79 Through time and motion study, managers could determine by ostensibly scientific methods the "one best method"80 to carry out even the simplest of tasks, and then require minute compliance with prescribed methods by workers.81 71. Id Most important for our purposes is an often overlooked facet of Taylor's project. In advocating the importance of managerial control, Taylor also announced a new principle of managerial responsibility. Firms could be, and indeed, properly ought to be responsible for managing wide swaths of American social life. "[I]n its essence," Taylor explained to a congressional committee in 1912, "scientific management involves a complete mental revolution ...."82
To be sure, workers needed to rethink "their duties toward their work, toward their fellow men, and toward their employers."83 But scientific management also involved
[an] equally complete mental revolution on the part of those on the management's side-the foreman, the superintendent, the owner of the business, the board of directors-a complete mental revolution on their part as to their duties toward their fellow workers in the management, toward their workmen, and toward all of their daily problems.84 Worker discipline, in Taylor's view, went hand in hand with managerial responsibility.
In the case of work accidents, for example, Taylor favored employerprovided accident insurance benefits, financed through fines paid by the workers for disciplinary infractions.85 By 1900, Taylor's Midvale Steel had set up precisely such an accident insurance plan. Employees contributed five cents per week to the insurance fund in return for injury and death benefits.86 And therein lay the seeds of a transformation in the ways in which American firms handled industrial injuries.
II.
Taylor was hardly the only manager seeking to design new ways of dealing with workplace accidents. By the 1890s the industrial accident had come to symbolize the crises of wasteful competition and clumsy labor management that seemed to beset the economy more generally. I [I]n practically all of the mechanic arts the science which underlies each workman's act is so great and amounts to so much that the workman who is best suited to actually doing the work is incapable, either through lack of education or through insufficient mental capacity, of understanding this science. have described the acute late nineteenthand early twentieth-century American industrial accident problem elsewhere.87 Suffice it to say that the United States witnessed industrial accident rates far in excess of those in comparable developing economies in western Europe. Fatality rates in coal mining, as measured per employee, ranged between two and three times as high in the United States as in Great Britain between 1880 and 1930.88 As measured by employee hour, railroad fatality rates were fifty percent higher in the United States than in Great Britain.89 Contemporary estimates of comparative accident rates were even more exaggerated, suggesting, for example, that accident rates among railroad employees in the United States were three and one-half times higher than in Great Britain for fatal injuries, and five times higher for nonfatal injuries.90
The avalanche of industrial accidents in the United States was itself, at least in part, a result of mid-century ideals of free labor and worker discretion in the Northern states in which industrial development began. Left to their own devices, individual workers often underestimated the risks they faced.91 In many occupations, risk taking even became part of the ethic of manly workingmen's culture.92 In turn, the accidents for which free labor ideas were partly responsible came to pose dilemmas for each of several widely held interpretations of the significance of free labor. Liberals, who sought to distinguish the boundaries of individuals' respective spheres of free action, found it increasingly difficult to allocate responsibility (even for relatively common two-party accidents) to one party or the other.93 Labor organization members prized the much vaunted independence that mid-century free labor had promised. But industrial accidents seemed to reduce to dependency tens of thousands of families each year.94
The school of free labor thought that held free markets in labor to be more efficient than mechanisms of hierarchical labor control was no exception to this pattern of disillusionment. The "industrial slaughter" of modern industry called further into doubt whether market mechanisms within the firm were indeed the most efficient way to organize labor. In response, the fledgling American engineering profession adopted acci- It may be useful at this moment to step back and define more precisely the engineers' conceptions of efficiency and waste. Modern economists generally define efficiency as the allocation of resources to their highest value users. But turn-of-the-twentieth-century engineers had an altogether different conception of efficiency as an economy of inputs to outputs. On this view, engineers understood processes as efficient if they conserved resources, measured not in dollars but in sheer amount of natural resources, raw materials, and muscle power required.95 Conversely, engineers viewed processes that exhausted excess resources as inefficient and wasteful. As one engineer put it in 1901, "the most conspicuous tendency of human activity is to get a maximum result by a minimum of expenditure. Minimum cost of fuel, of transportation, of brain and muscle, must hereafter be considered in the mighty competition that characterizes the commerce of the world."96
The inputs to outputs conception of efficiency was quite common at the close of the nineteenth century and into the first decade of the twentieth. As historians since 
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[Vol. 103:1 SPEEDY FRED TAYLOR be able to conserve the nation's resources and "transmit them, still unexhausted, to our descendants?"'00 Engineers turned to the problem of the waste in industrial accidents with the same spirit of conservation that Roosevelt and Pinchot brought to natural resources. Only a few years earlier, observed one electrical engineer, the United States had been a "young nation with vast natural resources....
[B]ut suddenly we find that our resources have been squandered and are approaching exhaustion."'10 In his view, the greatest waste was not in natural resources but rather in human resources. Inefficiency was responsible for the terrible "harvest of death, disaster and misery" embodied in the United States's disgraceful accident record.102 In the words of another engineer, the problem of "conserving the Nation's resources" was deeply bound up in "the prevention of accidents."'03 Indeed, even those who focused on natural resources such as water, forests, fatalities appeared to be the fault of the miners themselves. Roof falls were often caused by a miner's careless placement of supporting timbers; cave-ins often resulted from leaving insufficient coal in supporting coal pillars; and blasting mishaps often occurred while a miner carelessly examined an apparently failed fuse, only to have the charge explode unexpectedly.12' Moreover, roof falls, small cave-ins, and blasting mishaps were much more common than catastrophic mining disasters, accounting for at least three-quarters of all coal mining fatalities.122 But from the perspective of sophisticated mining engineers, extraordinarily high mining accident rates were in fact the result of the basic structure of labor management in the mines. Mine operators paid miners according to tonnage rates that rewarded miners who ignored safety measures in return for increased yields.123 In particular, tonnage payments that did not penalize miners for producing undesirably fine coal (known as "slack") encouraged miners to employ dangerously large amounts of powder without first undercutting the coal face.124 "Shooting off the solid," as this practice was called, was exceedingly dangerous.125
minerals, and lands saw in the accident problem a pressing problem of conservation. "[I]f the conservation of the natural resources is for man, it is an obvious suggestion that man himself should be conserved," observed
The basic design of the mines also helped to make American mining more dangerous than European mining. In England, "longwall" mine design placed miners along a few long coal faces.126 Such workers could easily be supervised by foremen. In addition, longwall mining minimized the danger of roof falls. In the United States, by contrast, the "room-andpillar" method used a sprawling complex of small rooms propped up by coal and timber pillars.127 Miners worked in isolation in a labyrinth of tunnels and cut-outs in the coal seam. As a result, supervision was virtually impossible, and roof falls were exacerbated by the multiplicity of small rooms.
In both setting tonnage rates and adopting dangerous room-and-pillar mining practices, management engineers argued, mine owners had implemented poorly thought-out approaches to designing and managing work in American mines. Careless miners might also be necessary antecedents to many mining accidents. But miners would always be careless. Management systems, on the other hand, could be made more or less effective, and in this sense, ineffective management systems had produced wasteful accident rates. Management engineers' answer to the industrial accident crisis was a twofold rationalization of the internal operations of the firm. Employers experimented with private forms of worker compensation in the form of firm-specific employee accident compensation funds, or "establishment funds" as they were often called. Managers seeking to rationalize the production process also began to advocate and experiment with new methods of making work processes safer.
As the Chandler thesis has it, the railroads pioneered in the field of management engineering.128 And it was on the railroads that employee accident relief funds first emerged as an important accident compensation mechanism. The Philadelphia and Reading Railroad endowed a $20,000 accident fund for its coal mine workers after an 1875 strike in the Pennsylvania anthracite fields, and created an accident plan for its engi- The system is briefly this: A fund is accumulated by the voluntary contributions on the part of employes to the amount of one day's wages or less, but in no case to exceed three dollars, as called for by the administration of the fund, to meet demands for the payment of benefits. The company on its part makes a contribution equal in amount to the total contributions of the employes. Benefits are only paid in the case of accidents, and to employes who responded to the last call for contributions. The value of the daily benefit is equal to three-fourths of the amount contributed by the injured member on the last call, during a period not exceeding nine months. In case of death, $50 is immediately paid for funeral expenses, and subsequently to the family of the deceased, during two years, the accident benefit to which the deceased would have been entitled. Becker (pts. 1 & 3) , supra note 62, at 537, 823.
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See, e.g., Constitution and By-Laws: Employes' Mutual Benefit Association Pension System of the Minneapolis St. Railway Co., art. III, at 2 (1915) (available in Wisconsin Mutual Aid holdings, supra note 142) (on file with the Columbia Law Review) (listing as an object of the association "to promote a helpful spirit of co-operation among the employees of the Company"); Emory R. Johnson, Railway Departments for the Relief
and Insurance of Employes, 6 Annals Am. Acad. Pol. & Soc. Sci. 424, 424 (1895) ("The relief department is one of the many agencies that have been called into being to assist In the solution of the labor problem."); see also id. at 426-27 (arguing that the "chief' motive for the implementation of railway relief departments was "to cultivate a spirit of loyalty strong enough not only to prevent strikes, but also to prompt men to give the highest grade of service of which they are capable"). bor organizations on the railroads.l73 Undermining worker allegiance to the brotherhoods thus became a central goal of railroad management, and railroad relief funds were frequently employed toward this end.174 In 1887, for example, after the especially bitter Knights of Labor-led strike on many of the nation's railroads, the Philadelphia and Reading Railroad Company's statistician suggested to the railroad's president that an accident relief fund would be "the most expedient way by which an alienation of the men from orders such as the 'Knights of Labor' may be made effective, thereby establishing a closer relationship [between the road and its workers]."175 Furthermore, in the eyes of management engineers, employer accident insurance benefits would lead to substantial reductions in waste. Century 249-50 (1983) . On the railroad strikes of the late nineteenth century, see generally Foner, supra note 45 (detailing 1877 strikes); Painter, supra note 45; Nick Salvatore, Eugene V. Debs: Citizen and Socialist (1982) (profiling prominent labor leader and describing strikes). 174. Willoughby, supra note 131, at 317 (suggesting that establishment funds on the railroads were "organized by the roads in order better to control their employes, to prevent their striking, and to undermine the influence of their organizations"). 
The internalization of accident costs to the enterprise, they suggested, would rationalize the relationship between inputs and outputs in the production process. The editors of Engineering Magazine, for example, noted that "[i]t should hardly be necessary to observe that the real responsibility [for railroad accidents] is a matter which lies higher up than with the train crew."176 After all, "no military officer" would endeavor "to shift the responsibility of matters entrusted to his command to the shoulders of his inferiors."177 Nor, then, should railroad management suffer to allow the responsibility for work accidents to fall on the shoulders of employees. Yet at common law, the engineers argued, employers were able to ignore accidents involving employees because they were generally not liable for the costs of injuries to workers. The common law thus created perverse incentives to waste human labor power. Employer-financed relief funds and expanded employers' liability, by contrast, would encourage firms to reduce accident costs. As one railway management engineer put it, it seemed that "the proper way to prevent accidents on railroads was to lash a director of the company to the front of each locomotive."178
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Asher, supra note 129, at 23 (alteration in original) (citations omitted). On welfare capitalism as a strategy to undermine labor organizations, see Irving Bernstein, The Lean Years: A History of the
IV.
What did it mean for managerial engineers to identify the firm as the entity to which accident costs were properly internalized? The mid-nineteenth-century law of work accidents had taken for granted that employees were in the best position to prevent and avoid accidents. In the famous case of Farwell v. Boston & Worcester Rail Road, for example, Chief Justice Lemuel Shaw ruled that employers were not liable for employee injuries caused by the negligence of a fellow employee because "[t]hese are perils which the servant is as likely to know, and against which he can as effectively guard, as the master."'79 In work accidents, he asserted, the safety of employees depended not so much on the care of the employer but rather upon "the care and skill" of the employees themselves.180 If Shaw had spoken about internalizing the costs of accidents, he presumably would have said they should be internalized to the worker, not to the firm. Railroad collisions formed a second great preoccupation of accident prevention engineers in the 1890s, but here the results were ambiguous. Train collisions, in the words of one engineer, represented the "most disgraceful, because entirely avoidable, class of accidents."205 In the 1880s and early 1890s, engineers had focused on improvements in the physical infrastructure of the railroad industry as the most productive way to reduce the accident rate, developing and implementing improvements in bridge construction, track gauges, roadway and car design, automatic couplers, and air brakes.206 But by the middle and late 1890s and the first decade of the twentieth century, management engineers on the railroads had come to believe that employee negligence was far and away the greatest cause of railroad collisions.207 Nearly seventy percent of accidents on the railroads, according to one engineering estimate, were "due entirely to the mental or physical state of the human agent."208 "[A]dmirable rules for the government of employes," observed another railway engineer, "are habitually disregarded."209 At grade crossings, junctions, drawbridges, and passing tracks, engineers persistently and inevitably violated state and company rules requiring them to stop, either out of concern to meet scheduling deadlines, or out of becoming accustomed to taking risks.210 As a result, it was futile to leave safety to the workers themselves.211 Indeed, in the engineers' view, "[m]en will be careless" inevitably, "and the railroad company should provide for this trait in human nature" by implementing automated safety devices that took the discretion and human agency out of railroad safety.212
The engineering literature of the late nineteenth century described a different kind of workplace, one that reflected both changes in the structure of work and management engineers' aspirations to the substitution of managerial power for worker control. To be sure, the engineers argued that accidents at work almost always involved employee carelessness, ignorance, and inattention. Boiler operators grew accustomed toand thus complacent about-startlingly dangerous steam conditions;181 miners held foolish folk ideas about the varying degrees of danger associated with different concentrations of coal damp in mines;182 blasting workers resisted the implementation of scientifically tested safety devices;183 railroad engineers invariably grew accustomed to small but potentially disastrous deviations from prescribed safety procedures;'84 and workers in high technology fields such as electricity could not be trusted to understand the basic principles of safety in novel working environments.185 In these respects, the engineers shared Shaw's view of the con-
In particular, engineers advocated automated block and automated train stop systems as alternatives to the signaling system typically used by American railroads in the 1890s. Under the signaling system, railroad employees whose duty it was to give signals stood at critical junctures in the railroad line and used flags to give signals to oncoming traffic indicating the presence of trains ahead. The difficulty with this approach, as the engineering press was quick to point out after railroad disasters, was that it left "a single employee to judge whether to protect the lives of half a hundred passengers the precautions laid down by the rules shall be observed."213 Poor judgment or carelessness by a signal man, or the decision by an engineer to override the signal, could lead to catastrophe. The 897, 897 (1893-1894) ; Hansel, supra note 210, at 605; Charles A. Howard, Safety in American Railway Transport, 34 Cassier's Mag. 3, 3-9 (1908); Prevention of Railway Accidents, supra note 207, at 819; see also Aldrich, supra note 88, at 169-71 (observing that railroad journals advocated the use of devices that could apply the brake "in spite of the engineman"). American railroads.215 A larger, but still relatively small, portion of American railroads implemented manual block signals. The manual block signal system divided the track into sections (or "blocks"), and trains were prohibited from entering a block of track unless it was empty. The manual block system, however, still relied on enginemen to follow the signals and on railroad workers to follow the progress of trains through the blocks and to set signals accordingly.216 Moreover, only twenty-two percent of American railroad mileage was in the 
Swan advocated an approach to strict liability in work accidents, "what we may call," he suggested, "the principle of enterprise liability for industrial injuries."254
The question left open by the workmen's compensation theory of enterprise liability, however, is whence derived the principles of workmen's compensation? How and why did American law come to the core principles-cost internalization, cost spreading, and worker (or consumer) powerlessness-that underlay the workmen's compensation statutes and the subsequent enterprise liability revolution? It is here that we see the importance of the scientific management movement. Charles Herbert Swan, interestingly, was not a lawyer, but rather an engineer.255 It was no coincidence that engineers helped to develop the phrase "enterprise liability." The movement to expand enterprise liability that characterized the dramatic changes in American tort law in the second half of the twentieth century rested on the same core elements that undergirded the management engineers' claims to increased managerial control of the firm. Management engineers, as we have seen, argued that management was in the best position to establish and monitor efficient work processes and to minimize the frequency and severity of accidents, and that workers themselves were unequipped to prevent workplace accidents effectively because of their inferior institutional position, their lack of training and education, and their ostensibly habitual carelessness and ignorance.256 These same managerial engineers, in turn, provided important support to workmen's compensation statutes at the time of their enactment.257 It was but a short step from these ideas to the theory that enterprises themselves were properly responsible for the costs of injuries incident to their operations more generally.
Ultimately, the three premises of the ideology of enterprise liability may be reduced to a single proposition-what
we might call the idea of managerial domination-and its inverse. The proposition holds that with respect to managing risk, well managed enterprises are in a superior structural and informational position than individuals such as workers and consumers. The inverse to the proposition, naturally, is that individuals-whether workers or consumers-are not in a position to evaluate, prevent, or provide for the dangers inhering in modern enterprise. These two closely related propositions lead ineluctably to each of the three claims of the ideology of enterprise liability. First, they solve the [Vol. 103:1 bile injury cases.263 And by the 1920s and 1930s, American legal academics sought to generalize the premises of the management engineer initiatives that had begun in the final decades of the nineteenth century. Realists such as Leon Green argued that liability was generally best placed on parties "in charge of the operation of complex and dangerous machinery," who could best take "preventive or prophylactic" steps. 264 The trend was especially apparent in the field of consumer injuries. Commentators urged expanded manufacturers' liability to third parties for defective products and unsafe food on the ground that such liability would internalize the costs of injuries such that "[t]he loss consequently will be borne by those who are interested in ... safe production and preparation,"265 or such that "losses . . . will most effectively induce preventive measures. If employers were in a better position than employees to prevent work injuries, perhaps firms were likely to be in a better position than any number of other actors (consumers, third parties, etc.) to prevent a wide range of accidents. Workmen's compensation statutes, noted Karl Llewellyn in a 1924 address to the American Economic Association, had placed accident costs on the party "not only best able to distribute, but best able to prevent" industrial accidents.272 In Llewellyn's view, the law had already begun (slowly) to apply the same principle in other fields. Blasting operations were strictly liable for injuries to bystanders; the "growing common law tendency" was to make product manufacturers insurers of their products.273 Llewellyn's conclusion warrants quoting in full: "In one, the producing laborer is the object of concern; in one, the bystander or neighboring owner; in a third, the consumer. But all alike recognize the dependence of laborer, bystander or consumer on an industry with which as an individual he cannot cope ...."274 Llewellyn's point was that the principles of workmen's compensation-and more specifically, the principles of scientific management's reengineering of the workplace-might be applied much more broadly than merely to work-accident legislation. Dickinson in 1950, not individuals, that were "in a strategic position to reduce accidents."276 In subsequent decades, this congerie of closely related ideas reached perhaps its fullest articulation in the work ofJames's student, Guido Calabresi, who put into sophisticated economic terms the intuitions that had percolated in the literature going back to Douglas and even earlier, to the theorists of workmen's compensation legislation. 277 The proposition of managerial domination in the products context was not a necessary or inevitable perspective. To be sure, it is widely agreed that manufacturers are in a better position than consumers to know about the risks of their products.278 Yet as students of accidents and insurance regularly point out, individual consumer behavior is also a critically important factor in products cases, and here consumers often have dramatic advantages over firms as avoiders of accidents.279 Moreover, individuals often have private information about their own risk profiles that firms do not.280 The expansion of tort liability that began in the middle of the twentieth century continued into the 1980s, though it seems to have abated in subsequent years. Needless to say, the new tort rules in products cases, among others, have caused considerable distress in today's management circles. Consider a recent commentary from the United States Chamber Institute for Legal Reform, an affiliate of the Chamber of Commerce:
By the 1940s and 1950s, the idea that
Nonetheless, in what is now a familiar story, judges in the nation's state courts broadened the reach of these risk management ideas into an array of new fields.28' New products liability cases held manufacturers and sellers liable for manufacturing282 and design defects,283 as well as
The United States' lawsuit-crazy civil justice system seems bent on wrecking our economy through excessive litigation and burdening the court system with thousands of frivolous lawsuits. The cost of the U.S. civil justice system is growing at four times the rate of our economy. The impact of this runaway system can be measured in businesses bankrupt, jobs lost, and shareholder value destroyed.302 The Chamber of Commerce and other manufacturers' groups have waged a now two-decade old campaign in the name of "tort reform" to roll back the enterprise liability revolution.303 Taylor's old organization, the American Society of Mechanical Engineers, even plays a role in such efforts as an "active member of the American Tort Reform Association."304 As I have suggested in this article, however, a deep irony pervades managerial tort reform efforts, and nowhere more so than in the ASME, which finds in enterprise liability today ideas it helped to propagate a century ago.
In the same years in which American managerial engineers were getting their campaign underway, Max Weber described the Anglo American common law as deeply resistant to modernist systematization.305 In contrast to the codified rules and professional judges of continental legal systems, the common law represented a kind of irrational khadi justice, Weber contended, its judges and juries latter-day oracles.306 The reappearance in contemporary tort law of managerial engineers' ideas about managerial control in the workplace is emblematic of the resistance to systematic rationalization and reengineering that Weber identified in the institutions of the American legal system. Managers could succeed (at least partially) in their campaign to control the firm, but control of the dispersed, often unaccountable decisionmakers in American tort law remained largely out of their reach. And so in the jurisdiction of judges and juries, the ideas that men such as Taylor had made popular were turned against the firms that had advocated them. If firms were properly responsible for the operations of the enterprise, the logic went, then they ought to be responsible for the injuries incident to those operations. Moreover, unlike workmen's compensation, which accompanied expanded notions of responsibility with sharp caps on damages awards, there have not generally been caps on damages in the common law courts in which tort decisions are made. In extraordinary cases, punitive damages might even be available.307 For scientific managers, enterprise responsibility would thus become a kind of Frankenstein's monster, an example of hyper-rationalization gone mad, haunting its creators in a new and (to them) hideous form.308
The resistance of judges and juries to the rationalizing impulses of the scientific managers also offers a useful perspective on the well-documented use of workmen's compensation by employers as early as the 
